Whilst there are some great examples of how to assess infrastructure as code dynamically with things like the Center for Internet Security‘s Docker benchmark and CoreOS‘s Clair, these kinda run a little too late in the pipeline for my liking. If we want to treat infrastructure as code then surely we ought to be performing code reviews and if we’re performing code reviews then perhaps we can perform a subset of these checks automatically pre-commit? Continue reading
In the context of a Red Team assessment, in this post I’ll look at some options for using SOCKS to gain external access to an internal network. I’ll cover the obvious methods and why I’m overlooking them, a crude method using standard tools (this post) and a more refined approach using modified tools (in part 2). Continue reading
By way of an introduction to our talk at Black Hat Europe, Security Advisory EMEAR would like to share the background on our recent research into some common Active Directory integration solutions. Just as with Windows, these solutions can be utilized to join UNIX infrastructure to enterprises’ Active Directory forests. Continue reading
In this post we look at an alternative to compiling shared object files when exploiting vulnerable setUID programs on Linux. At a high level we’re just going to copy the binary and insert some shellcode. First we take a look the circumstances that might lead you to use this option. Also check out this previous post on setUID exploitation. Continue reading
Secure communications are one of the most important topics in information security and the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol is currently the most used protocol to provide secure communications on Internet. For example, when you are connecting to your online banking application, your favorite instant message application or social networks, all those communications are being transmitted using TLS. With TLS the information sent by the browser and the service is secured and encrypted, meaning that the information cannot be modified or tampered with by an attacker. Moreover the communications are verified to ensure that the browser is connected to the right endpoint (e.g. Wikipedia). Continue reading
In my previous post, I worked around the fact that the card reader could only read credit cards – when I wanted to read other types of magstripes. I’d thought at the time that it would theoretically be possible to replace the firmware. In this post I don’t get as far as writing new firmware, but I to present an easy way to download and upload firmware: The ST-Link v2 USB device (hardware) and associated ST-Link Utility (software). Continue reading
In this post I describe how my cheap magstripe reader wouldn’t read all magstripes, only credit/debit cards. This did nothing to help me understand what data was on my hotel key card – which is what I really wanted to know. Rather than take the obvious next step or buying a better reader, I opted to open up the cheap magstripe reader, probed around a bit and found a way to read the raw data off the hotel magstripes. What that data means remains a mystery so there may be a part 2 at some stage. Continue reading
In this post we look at at one of many security problems that pentesters and security auditors find in setUID programs. It’s fairly common for child processes to inherit any open file handles in the parent process (though there are ways to avoid this). In certain cases this can present a security flaw. This is what we’ll look at in the context of setUID programs on Linux. Continue reading
In this post we’ll take a brief look at inspectrum, a graphical tool for analysing signals captured via software defined radio (SDR) receivers – like the RTL-SDR or HackRF One. Continue reading
Following on from my colleague’s post on using UART to root a phone, I look at another of our challenges, whereby sensitive information such as passwords can be extracted from a device’s memory if physical access to the device is acquired. Continue reading