Whilst there are some great examples of how to assess infrastructure as code dynamically with things like the Center for Internet Security‘s Docker benchmark and CoreOS‘s Clair, these kinda run a little too late in the pipeline for my liking. If we want to treat infrastructure as code then surely we ought to be performing code reviews and if we’re performing code reviews then perhaps we can perform a subset of these checks automatically pre-commit? Continue reading
By way of an introduction to our talk at Black Hat Europe, Security Advisory EMEAR would like to share the background on our recent research into some common Active Directory integration solutions. Just as with Windows, these solutions can be utilized to join UNIX infrastructure to enterprises’ Active Directory forests. Continue reading
Presentation on Active Directory integration solutions for UNIX (as given at Black Hat Europe 2018). Continue reading
In this post we look at at one of many security problems that pentesters and security auditors find in setUID programs. It’s fairly common for child processes to inherit any open file handles in the parent process (though there are ways to avoid this). In certain cases this can present a security flaw. This is what we’ll look at in the context of setUID programs on Linux. Continue reading
Continuing on from part 1, we will look other benchmark settings that will help to reduce the surface area of attack. Continue reading
Microsoft released a rolling upgrade of Windows 10 in October 2017. The “Fall Creators” edition (version 1709, codename Redstone 3) contains a new feature called “Controlled Folder Access”, which is designed to combat ransomware attacks. Continue reading
Lateral Movement is a method used by attackers (or malware) against a network Domain. After an initial device is compromised (typically, a user’s workstation), the attacker extracts passwords from memory, or obtains encrypted password hashes from the system for cracking or direct use (i.e. Pass the Hash). The attacker then attempts to login to other systems using those credentials to search for cached passwords of privileged Domain accounts. Usually, the local Administrator account is targeted as the password is often the same on all systems (due to the common practice of deploying systems from a master image), but service accounts, etc. can also be targeted. Continue reading
It is a topic that often comes up on client engagements, usually when running structured build reviews of Linux “gold builds”, but occasionally when trying to explain in detail how we used a Linux system to pivot internally.
SetUID and setGID files are inevitably a risk, potentially allowing attackers to elevate privileges to root from a basic user. When shared out on SMB or NFS shares they can spread the risk even further. Continue reading
Following a recent post from a consultant at IBM discussing how how privileged access should be performed on VIOS, I figured it was time to share some of our research in this arena. Those of you that are regular readers will know that I love root. For those of you that are new, welcome aboard. Continue reading
At Portcullis, one of the more frequent assessments we perform are web application assessments. One of the main challenges we face during these assessments is to look for information that can either help escalate our privileges or allow us to gain access to different functionalities of the web application. Unauthorised access to functionality can often be considered an issue however, testing for this can also lead to information about the type of web server an application is running on, the underlying host and its version. Continue reading