In the context of a Red Team assessment, in this post I’ll look at some options for using SOCKS to gain external access to an internal network. I’ll cover the obvious methods and why I’m overlooking them, a crude method using standard tools (this post) and a more refined approach using modified tools (in part 2). Continue reading
In this post we look at an alternative to compiling shared object files when exploiting vulnerable setUID programs on Linux. At a high level we’re just going to copy the binary and insert some shellcode. First we take a look the circumstances that might lead you to use this option. Also check out this previous post on setUID exploitation. Continue reading
In my previous post, I worked around the fact that the card reader could only read credit cards – when I wanted to read other types of magstripes. I’d thought at the time that it would theoretically be possible to replace the firmware. In this post I don’t get as far as writing new firmware, but I to present an easy way to download and upload firmware: The ST-Link v2 USB device (hardware) and associated ST-Link Utility (software). Continue reading
In this post I describe how my cheap magstripe reader wouldn’t read all magstripes, only credit/debit cards. This did nothing to help me understand what data was on my hotel key card – which is what I really wanted to know. Rather than take the obvious next step or buying a better reader, I opted to open up the cheap magstripe reader, probed around a bit and found a way to read the raw data off the hotel magstripes. What that data means remains a mystery so there may be a part 2 at some stage. Continue reading
In this post we look at at one of many security problems that pentesters and security auditors find in setUID programs. It’s fairly common for child processes to inherit any open file handles in the parent process (though there are ways to avoid this). In certain cases this can present a security flaw. This is what we’ll look at in the context of setUID programs on Linux. Continue reading
In this post we’ll take a brief look at inspectrum, a graphical tool for analysing signals captured via software defined radio (SDR) receivers – like the RTL-SDR or HackRF One. Continue reading
This post describes how Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connections can be vulnerable to a downgrade attack if Terminal Servers are configured insecurely. Continue reading
This post describes how network eavesdroppers might record encrypted RDP sessions and at some later time (after a server compromise) be able to decrypt them. This could expose any data sent over the RDP connection including keystrokes, usernames and passwords. Continue reading
This post seeks to demonstrate why users learning to ignore those certificate warnings for SSL-based RDP connection could leave them open to “Man-In-The-Middle” attacks. The MiTM attack demonstrated displays keystrokes sent during an RDP session. We conclude with some advice on how to avoid being the victim of such an attack. Continue reading
rdp-sec-check is a Perl script to enumerate security settings of an RDP Service (AKA Terminal Services). Continue reading